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Abstract 
 
In the last decade or so, the EU has adopted a number of legislation aimed at liberalising 
network industries and developing an EU-level regulatory framework for those industries. 
Against this background, we examine the extent of liberalisation and the nature of market 
performance in a group of European network industries – namely, electricity, gas, rail 
transport, and telecommunications. To determine the extent of liberalisation, we will use a 
composite index of market opening for each industry in EU-15. To determine the impact of 
market opening on performance in network industries, we will examine a number of 
indicators for prices, employment, productivity, and customer perceptions. The evidence on 
market opening and performance will be discussed in the light of the second-best theory in 
economics. 
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opening. 1. Introduction 
 
Network industries in this paper refer to services of general economic interest such as gas, 
electricity, rail transport and telecommunications - which historically had been characterised 
by natural monopoly and public ownership.
1 In 15 members of the European Union (EU-15), 
network industries account for about 10% of total production and 7% of total employment. In 
terms of weight in the overall inflation, they contribute by about 7% to the harmonised index 
of consumer prices (HICP) (Martin et al, 2005: 8). The overall economic significance of these 
industries is greater than what the figures above would suggest because they also provide 
direct inputs for a wide range of other sectors in the EU-15 economy. Because of this 
particular status, the liberalisation of network industries is bound to affect not only the 
particular industries involved, but also the overall economic performance of EU-15. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide verifiable answers to a number of questions concerning the 
extent of liberalisation in network industries and the implications of liberalisation for prices, 
employment, productivity, and consumer satisfaction. The data we use is compiled from a 
number of sources, including the Eurostat, the Groningen Growth and Development Centre, 
the Copenhagen Economics, DG Internal Market of the European Commission, and a number 
of European Regulatory Groups. The extent of liberalisation and its implications will be 
discussed in the context of the theory of second-best.  
 
Section 2 of the paper provides general information on the characteristics of the network 
industries and relates these characteristics to the theory of second best in economics. Section 
3 reports some evidence on network industry liberalisation and its implications for prices, 
employment, and consumer satisfaction. Section 4 evaluates the findings in section 3 against 
current characteristics of the liberalised network industries in each member state, with a view 
to demonstrate why optimism about positive implications of liberalisation should be qualified. 
The discussion in sections 3 and 4 will focus on four industries for which data could be 
obtained: telecommunications, gas, electricity, and rail transport. Finally, the conclusion 
                                                 
1 Although we use ‘network industries’ as a descriptor in this paper, this is not the only terms used in the 
literature or public debate. The industries examined here are referred to as utilities, services of general economic 
interest, or public services. We prefer network industries here because this term does not imply any assumption 
about the type of ownership. In addition, it also dissociates the services of these industires from pure public 
goods which are non-rival and non-excludable. Finally, the term ‘network industries’ is less mouthful when 
compared to the term ‘services of general economic interest’ preferred by the European Commission and 
students of legal studies. brings the main findings together and relates the shortcomings of the liberalisation effort to 
the process of European integration. 
 
3. Characteristics of network industries and relevance of the theory of second best 
 
Historically, European network industries have been organised as natural monopolies under 
public ownership. There have been three main reasons for this type of industrial organisation: 
(i) natural monopoly due to decreasing average costs over the range of relevant output; (ii) 
non-divisibility of the network and high cost of duplicating the network infrastructure; and (iii) 
public service obligations. This is in contrast to the type of industrial organisation that was 
adopted in the United States since the early years of the 20
th century. In the US model, private 
ownership combined with regulation has been the norm. Therefore, the liberalisation of 
European network industries and the emergence of national/European regulators can be 
interpreted as a move towards the US model even though the emerging European model does 
not require privatisation.  
 
The rationale for the natural monopoly status and public ownership of the European network 
industries has begun to be questioned since mid-1980s. A number of factors have been 
influential in instigating such a process. First of all, fiscal constraints have reduced the 
willingness of European governments to continue to subsidise these industries and increased 
their interests in privatisation revenues. Secondly, the Single Market Project has reduced non-
tariff barriers significantly and made intra-EU trade increasingly sensitive to distortions 
emanating from non-trade policies. Because network industry products and services were 
used as inputs for the production of traded goods, different levels of subsidisation began to be 
seen as violations of the level playing field in the single European market. Third, 
technological developments have reduced the significance of network non-divisibility by 
allowing for different modes of access and different methods of measurement and charging. 
Finally, and as a logical extension of the Single Market logic, liberalisation began to be 
considered as a necessary measure that would increase competition and encourage 
technological innovation. Technological innovation in network industries was a crucial issue 
not only because of the strategic importance of these industries but also because of the 
indispensable role that general innovation plays in increasing total factor productivity.  
 Considered from a political economy perspective, these factors go a long way in explaining 
not only the timing of the European liberalisation effort but also the ease with which an 
alliance could be struck between European governments and the EU Commission. On the one 
hand, fiscal and strategic considerations have led to the convergence of national government 
preferences towards liberalisation and deregulation.
2 On the other hand, the achievement of 
convergent goals required the existence of a rule-setter/enforcer who would ensure the 
sustainability of the policy coordination game. It was against this background that the 
Commission was able to develop a gradual strategy of network industry liberalisation.  
 
The liberalisation of European network industries has been guided by three simple principles: 
(i) unbundling of upstream and downstream operators; (ii) non-discriminatory third-party 
access to the network; and (iii) supply of relevant information on access charges and different 
types of tariffs. Unbundling is considered as necessary to prevent cross-subsidisation and to 
reduce the ability of the incumbents to control upstream and downstream markets. Non-
discriminatory third-party access is necessary to inject a degree of market contestability 
through new entry. Finally, transparency of prices and access charges is necessary to prevent 
discrimination against new entrants and/or in favour of the incumbents’ affiliates.  
 
In terms of operation, liberalisation has been designed as a gradual process. Gradualism has 
been evident along two dimensions. On the one hand, the process began with the liberalisation 
of the least-controversial sector in terms of technology and political economy. That is why the 
liberalisation effort began in 1990 in the telecommunications sector, where the expansion of 
the product range and the level of technological change reduced the ‘public’ nature of the 
services provided. Then, market opening was extended to other services such as gas and 
electricity in the second half of the 1990s. Finally, it was introduced into rail transport at the 
beginning of 2000s. The other dimension of gradualism was observable as sequencing. The 
liberalisation effort began with unbundling, progressing through third-party access and 
culminating in the imposition of transparency rules and establishment of EU-level regulatory 
institutions. (See, Napolitano, 2005; Geradin, 2006; and Ugur, 2007).   
 
Existing EU documentation presents the liberalisation effort as a set of measures aimed at 
increasing efficiency and consumer welfare through increased competition and technological 
                                                 
2 On the role of preference convergence and its linkage to the process of integration, see Ugur (2004). innovation (EU Commission, 2005; 2007). A comprehensive study undertaken by 
Copenhagen Economics (2005) for the Internal Market Directorate-General of the EU 
Commission provides evidence on the positive effects of liberalisation on welfare and 
employment. Copenhagen Economics estimate that liberalisation has led to an increase of 
1.9% in welfare and 0.3% in overall employment from 1990-2001. These gains are relative to 
the base-year values in 2001 and are equivalent to Euros 98 billion per year and an overall 
employment gain of 500,000 over the 1990-2001 period. Another study by Martin et al (2005) 
reports that panel data estimations point out a significant decline in prices due to regulatory 
reforms in European network industries.  
 
This paper argues that such estimations are too optimistic because they ignore the 
complications that are likely to arise when a policy action constitutes a move within a second-
best environment as opposed to a move from a second-best to a first-bets environment. 
Market opening reforms in European network industries do not constitute a move from the 
second- to the first-best not only because of the continuity of the distortions in the rest of the 
economy, but also, and more importantly, because of the persistence of the distortions within 
the liberalised industries. The latter type of distortions persists after liberalisation because of 
the characteristics of the liberalised industries.  
 
One characteristic of the network industries is large market shares controlled by incumbents. 
The evidence we present in section 4 below indicates that 3 major companies has retained 
control of more than 75% of the market in all of the industries examined in this paper – 
namely, gas, electricity, rail transport and telecommunications. Another characteristic of the 
network industries is low demand and supply elasticities. While low demand elasticities 
enable network industry firms to increase their price-cost margins (mark-ups) without a 
significant fall in demand, low supply elasticities are conducive to price hikes in the face of 
capacity constraints. The combination of large market shares and low demand elasticities is 
conducive to increased mark-ups - as can be seen from the Lerner index.
3  The welfare gains 
predicted in the literature do not take account of the probability that the levels of mark-up 
may persist even if prices fall after market opening. The persistence of mark-up levels could 
                                                 
3 The Lerner index can be written as follows: L =  (P-MC)/P = Si/E, where L = Lerner index; P = market price; 
MC = marginal cost.; (P-MC)/P = price-cost margin or mark-up, Si = market share of firm i in an oligopilistic 
market with Cournot competiton; and E = price elasticity of demand;. The Lerner index (the mark-up) is higher 
the higher is the market share and the lower is the demand elasticity. be due to the fact that market opening reduces both prices and costs – leading to a continued 
wedge between marginal costs and prices.  
 
The third characteristic of network industries is the persistence of the economies of scale 
(falling average costs) and high levels of sunk costs even after liberalisation. This 
combination acts as a deterrent to new entry or has adverse effects on efficiency even if new 
entry is encouraged by regulation. Finally, regulation of liberalised industries may prove 
ineffective in securing competition due to the persistence of economies of scope, which arises 
from joint supply of differentiated products using the existing network infrastructure. 
Economies of scope involve cost advantages due to joint production and reduce the 
effectiveness of the regulators for two reasons. First, it enables the incumbents to deter new 
entry into profitable market segments through price cuts. Secondly, economies of scope and 
joint production enable the incumbents to impose excessive prices in non-profitable segments 
by using joint production costs as a means of concealing the true cost in the non-profitable 
segments. (For further discussion, see ERG, 2005a; Buehler, 2005). 
 
Because of these likely complications, it is necessary to examine the liberalisation of network 
industries as a policy initiative in a world of second-best. The second-best environment is 
characterised by the existence of distortions that prevent the achievement of a Pareto-
optimum equilibrium in which nobody can be made better off without making somebody else 
worse off.  The theory of second-best states that a partial removal of distortions is not 
necessarily conducive either to first-best Pareto-optimality or welfare improvement. As 
Lipsey and Lancaster (1956: 12) have indicated; 
 
… in a situation in which there exist many constraints which prevent the fulfilment of the Paretian 
optimum conditions, the removal of any one constraint may affect welfare or efficiency either by 
raising it, by lowering it, or by leaving it unchanged.  
 
The reason why a partial move towards the first best does not necessarily improve welfare or 
efficiency is due to the fact that the satisfaction of necessary conditions (e.g., market opening 
and deregulation of network industries) does not necessarily imply the satisfaction of 
sufficient conditions (i.e., the removal of all distortions that prevent the achievement of a 
perfectly competitive general equilibrium). This is why Lipsey and Lancaster (1956: 17) 
criticise ‘piecemeal welfare economics’ for basing its policy recommendations on the ‘belief that a study of the necessary conditions for a Paretian welfare optimum may lead to the 
discovery of sufficient conditions for an increase in welfare.’ A similar conclusion is derived 
by Baumol (1965: 138), who states that ‘partial policy measures which eliminate only some 
of the departures from the optimal arrangement may well result in a net decrease in social 
welfare.’ 
 
Policy recommendations based on computable general equilibrium simulations ignore the 
complications highlighted by the theory of second best. Therefore, they may be based on 
assumptions that are too optimistic. This may be the case for two reasons. First, we may never 
be able to identify and implement all of the sufficient conditions. Secondly, even if it is 
possible to identify and implement the sufficient conditions the cost of implementation may 
outweigh the benefits of first-best policies. These problems are stated more explicitly in a 
recent article by Lipsey (2007: 5), in which he draws attention to the following:  
 
Market structures are rarely competitive enough to make marginal cost equal to price: oligopoly, 
monopolistic competition and monopoly vastly outnumber cases where firms are price takers. Some 
price setting behaviour occurs because of technologically determined factors such as scale economies, 
some because of firm-determined entry barriers and product characteristics and some because of 
policy.’  
 
These are just the type of problems we are faced with when we study the liberalisation of 
network industries. If the wedge between marginal costs and prices are due to technology, 
imposing equality between marginal costs and prices would be a welfare-reducing policy. If 
the wedge is due to firm behaviour or existing policies, the move towards eliminating the 
wedge would be welfare-increasing only if all other distortions have been removed.  In 
addition to this qualification, we are also faced with the problem of how to distinguish 
between technology-induced and ‘policy’-induced distortions in a world characterised by a 
multiplicity of distortions.  
 
Of course, the existence of such problems does not invalidate imply that the type of market 
opening reforms examined in this paper are necessarily welfare-reducing. For example, 
Bhagwati et al (1969: 1009) argue that  
 A small dose of a policy that has some effect on the distorted margin is better than no policy at all, 
because the initial marginal gain from mitigating the distorted market is of first order while the initial 
welfare cost from introducing the new distortion is of second order.  
 
Similarly, Rakowski (1980) states that a movement towards Pareto optimality may not 
necessarily increase welfare, but if distortions are ‘sufficiently minor and insignificant’ 
departures from Pareto optimality are likely to be ‘minor and insignificant’. In other words, a 
partial move towards Pareto-optimality may reduce the welfare loss even if it does not ensure 
the achievement of Pareto optimality. These arguments are intuitive and inform economic 
policy decisions to a large extent. However, as Lipsey (2007) indicates, these arguments 
would be valid only if the policy introduces a distortion that was previously zero. In other 
words, a partial movement towards the first best may not even guarantee a reduction in 
welfare losses if it affects existing distortions. This is very likely to be the case because the 
main aim of the policy is to remove existing distortions. That is why Blackorby (1990: 757) 
remains convinced that ‘moving prices closer to marginal costs would not lead to an 
improvement in welfare, actual or potential.’  
 
The main conclusion of the theory of second best is highly relevant to the issue discussed in 
this paper – namely, the liberalisation of network industries. As indicated above, the main 
objective of the liberalisation effort is to reduce the monopoly power (hence the price-cost 
margins) of incumbent monopolists. If we focus only on welfare and efficiency implications 
of this policy move, we may well find a positive impact on both variables. However, this 
impact must be adjusted to account for the welfare and efficiency costs that arise from the 
interaction between the policy move itself and any distortion that it cannot address. Such 
distortions may continue to exist after the policy has been introduced either because the policy 
is not designed to eliminate them or it cannot eliminate them altogether even if this was its 
primary objective.  
 
Unfortunately, welfare implications estimated by studies of market opening and deregulation 
in European network industries do not take into account the costs of second-best solutions. 
They assume that such costs are zero and estimate only the static and/or dynamic effects that 
result from changes in prices and/or productivity. That is why such estimations are too 
optimistic and as such they are either inaccurate or inappropriate bases for policy 
recommendations or evaluations. This does not imply that the estimates are totally irrelevant and that prices may not fall or productivity may not improve after liberalisation. What is 
indicated here is that the positive impact of liberalisation and market opening reforms must be 
discounted by the costs of any distortion that may be left untouched or may even be 
exacerbated by the partial nature of these reforms.  
 
 
3. Market opening in European network industries: impact on prices, productivity, 
employment and consumer satisfaction. 
 
As indicated above, EU-level market opening reforms were introduced into network 
industries at different times and with different speed. The earliest EU-level liberalisation 
reforms were introduced in the telecommunications sector in 1990. This was followed by the 
gas and electricity liberalisation from 1996 onwards. Rail transport liberalisation through EU-
level legislation began in 1991 but it remained highly limited until the adoption of the first 
railways package in early 2000s. In their work for the DG Internal Market of the EU 
Commission, Copenhagen Economics have constructed a market opening index based on the 
implementation of market opening milestones that reflect the implementation of national and 
EU-level legislation. The index takes values between 0 and 1, with 0 corresponding to 
closed/protected markets and 1 corresponding to fully liberalised markets. The results are 
given in Table 1 below. 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, market opening has remained limited in most of the sectors until 
mid-1990s. This is due partly to the time-lag between legislation and implementation and 
partly to reluctance of national governments to implement EU legislation. The latter reason is 
the more significant because EU legislation tends to provide a framework rather than a 
detailed programme reform. Following the slow start, the value of the market opening index 
began to increase from mid-1990s onwards. However, even then the level of market opening 
remained less than 50% until 2000 in almost all of the sectors. By 2003, the level of market 
opening ranged between 50-70%.  
  Table 1: Market opening index (MOI) for network industries: EU-15 
 MOI-
Telecoms 
MOI- 
Gas 
MOI-
Electricity  MOI-Rail 
passengers 
MOI- 
Rail freight 
1990 0.08  0.00  0.12 0.01 0.07 
1991 0.11  0.00  0.12 0.04 0.08 
1992 0.11  0.00  0.13 0.04 0.08 
1993 0.12  0.00  0.13 0.05 0.09 
1994 0.14  0.00  0.14 0.18 0.30 
1995 0.15  0.04  0.15 0.19 0.33 
1996 0.17  0.04  0.17 0.31 0.40 
1997 0.22  0.04  0.18 0.38 0.47 
1998 0.39  0.13  0.21 0.41 0.48 
1999 0.40  0.30  0.31 0.43 0.58 
2000 0.55  0.42  0.37 0.50 0.61 
2001 0.68  0.47  0.63 0.51 0.62 
2002 0.72  0.63  0.67 0.51 0.63 
2003 n.a.  0.70  0.69  0.51 0.66 
 
   Source:  Copenhagen  Economics  (2005) 
 
 
Market opening reflected in Table 1 is expected to have two major effects on network 
industry prices. One effect is a reduction in prices that would come through two channels: 
reduced price-cost margins (mark-ups) and increased efficiency. The second effect is 
convergence between national prices which, again, would be due to two reasons. On the one 
hand, EU-level rules will reduce the price-cost margins and this reduction will be greater in 
countries where the incumbents had been able to extract higher mark-ups. As a result, we 
expect price convergence between EU countries. On the other hand, third-party access rights 
will increase competition and encourage new entry of firms from other member states, which 
again leads to international price convergence. Therefore, market opening reforms in network 
industries are considered as a highly significant step towards deeper integration not only in 
terms of creating a level playing field for competition but also in terms of their contribution to 
the achievement of Lisbon goals.  
 
The link between network industry opening and the Lisbon agenda becomes more visible 
when one considers the impact of market opening on productivity.  This impact is expected to positive because market opening is conducive to higher levels of allocative and/or managerial 
efficiency. Allocative and managerial efficiency can be expected to increase due to increased 
competition and the disappearance of subsidies as a bailing-out mechanism that enables 
inefficient companies to survive. Similarly, the impact of market opening on consumer 
satisfaction is expected to be positive as customers will enjoy lower prices and increased 
customer care in a competitive market environment. The impact of market opening reforms 
on employment, however, is less clear-cut. On the one hand, employment may increase in the 
relevant industry as new firms enter the market and technological innovation leads to an 
increase in the product/service range on offer. On the other hand, increased competition may 
induce companies to substitute capital for labour and lead to a fall in employment at the 
industry level. Therefore, the net impact on industry-level employment may be uncertain. 
This uncertainty, however, may be overcome by a positive impact on the rest of the economy 
that uses the output of the network industries as inputs. To the extent that network industry 
prices fall, production costs in the rest of the economy will fall and this may lead to an 
increase in the demand for labour.  
 
The evidence presented below lends some support to some of these expected effects but not to 
all of them. Table 2 below provides some evidence on average network industry prices in EU-
15.
4  
 
Table 2: Network industry price indices: EU-15 average prices; 1997 = 100 
  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Telecommunications Price Indices 1997=100 (Euro per 10 min call)       
Local calls price index: EU-15   100.0  107.0  105.4  104.3  105.9  102.0  102.5  100.5  97.1 
National calls price index EU 15  100.0  82.8  69.0  53.8  40.7  36.9  35.7  31.1  29.2 
Electricity prices indices 1997=100 (Euro per kWh)         
Electricity  household  price  index  100.0  99.0 97.1 95.9 96.9 98.0 101.3  102.9  105.1 
Electricity industrial price index  100.0  98.0  95.2  94.2  94.5  94.9  102.1  98.5  105.5 
Gas prices indices1997=100 (Euro  per  Gigajoule)        
Gas  housholds  price  index  100.0  101.4 95.0  102.9 127.9 121.7 123.4 121.1 133.8 
Gas  industrial  price  index  100.0  96.3  82.1  103.3 152.2 134.6 137.8 133.7 152.3 
HICP,  EU 15, 1997=100  100.0  101.3 102.5 104.4 106.7 109.0 111.1 113.3 115.7 
 
HICP = Harmonised index of consumer prices (inflation measure in EU-15). 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
                                                 
4 Data for rail transport is not available.  
Table 2 suggests that prices in the telecommunications industry has fallen significantly over 
time and in comparison with the level of inflation. This is in line with the expected effect of 
market opening. In addition, the fall in local and national call charges can be related to market 
opening reforms as the telecommunications industry was the first to be liberalised gradually 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The average price index for electricity reflects a less clear-
cut trend as it started to increase from 2003 onwards. Nevertheless, the average price index 
for households and industrial customers has remained below the HICP index – reflecting 
some price-dampening effect of the market opening reforms in this industry since mid-1990s. 
The average price index for gas, however, has increased over time and relative to the HICP 
index despite the fact that the market opening reforms in this industry began at the same time 
as electricity. Reasons put forward for explaining the increase in gas prices include the 
following: (i) indexation of gas prices to oil prices; (ii) supply bottlenecks caused by network 
capacity; (iii) significant market power enjoyed by incumbents; and (iv) long durations of 
sale/purchase contracts. (ERGEG, 2006; EU Commission, 2007).  
 
The mixed picture reflected in Table 2 does not invalidate the expectation that market opening 
reforms could lead to falling prices in general. However, it calls for caution because market 
liberalisation, combined with significant market power and low demand elasticities, can also 
limit the fall in prices and lead to higher levels of price volatility. With respect to limited price 
falls, Buehler (2005) report that unbundling of an integrated network industry may increase 
retail prices whereas freer entry may reduce them – with the overall effect remaining 
uncertain. Even if the net effect is a fall in prices, this may be due to strategies aimed at 
preventing entry rather than higher levels of competition. In that sense, the fall in price levels 
can be a reversible outcome – as can be seen from the gas and electricity price levels in Table 
2. Borenstein et al (2002) and Bushnell and Mansur (2005) also confirm that market opening 
reforms can be conducive to increased price volatility. In addition, the demand adjusts to price 
changes only with a significant time lag. Therefore, price volatility may be conducive to 
divergence from consumer optimality, which requires that marginal costs be equal to marginal 
benefits. 
 
Another expected effect of market opening is the convergence of national prices as a result of 
competition. Table 3 below indicates that there has been a degree of convergence between 
telecommunications prices and industrial consumer prices of electricity. Observable convergence may be related to competition in the telecommunications sector, but it cannot be 
related to competition in other sectors where prices fell only marginally or increased. In fact, 
the evidence in Table 3 suggests that prices are more convergent in the electricity and gas 
sectors where competition is quite limited. This may be due either to the similarity of cost 
structures or to price coordination in oligopolistic markets. Irrespective of what the cause is, it 
is clear that the relationship between price convergence and competition is not as 
straightforward as the proponents of liberalisation would expect.  
 
Table 3: Coefficients of variation (CV) for network industry prices: EU-15* 
  1997  1998 1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004  2005 
Telecommunications price              
Local call price  CV  39.3  42.5  40.5  35.5  34.2 31.0 31.3 26.1  26.3 
National  call  price  CV  48.4  52.4 48.5  47.4  42.4 38.3 37.3 41.7  36.6 
Electricity price               
Electricity  household  price  CV  28.9  29.0 27.9  26.9  28.0 23.4 22.0 21.1  22.6 
Electricity  industrial  price  CV  20.2  20.1 20.9  18.9  24.3 22.7 14.7 17.0  18.3 
Gas prices                
Gas  household  price  CV  16.4  13.1 14.8  15.6  23.1 21.1 18.3 15.3  17.0 
Gas  industrial  price  CV  14.9  16.0 18.9  12.1  21.6 14.5 12.4 12.1  14.4 
* = Prices are as defined in table 1. 
Source: Eurostat, Structural Indicators at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu  
 
Similar observations can be made with respect to productivity levels. Market opening reforms 
are expected to have a positive effect on productivity and this is borne partly by the evidence 
in Table 4 below. Data availability is limited to two sectors only and the data for electricity 
and gas is not disaggregated. What is evident form Table 4 is that productivity (either per 
employee or per hour worked) in some of the network industries has been increasing at faster 
rates compared to that of total industry. In the telecommunications sector, the productivity 
gains may be related to market opening reforms because liberalisation of this sector began in 
early 1990s. However, even in this sector, the relationship between market opening and 
productivity gains should be analysed with care. If we look at Table 1, we can see that market 
opening in the telecommunications sector remained less than 50% until 2000. Given this 
limited market opening, it would be difficult to treat the productivity gains as a consequence 
of liberalisation. The increase in telecommunications productivity may well be due to 
technological developments that had begun before liberalisation. Of course, this caveat does not preclude the possibility that the EU has introduced market opening reforms with a view to 
increase the probability of adaptation to new technologies. 
 
Table 4: Productivity index for network industries and total industry: 
1995 = 100, volumes. 
  Labour productivity per employee  Labour productivity per hour 
 
Electricity, gas 
and water 
supply 
Communica 
tions 
Total 
industry 
Electricity, gas and 
water supply 
Communica
tions 
Total 
industry 
1990  80.5 75.4 90.9  79.4  74.3  89.0 
1991  84.2 78.8 92.1  83.7  78.1  90.8 
1992  87.0 83.4 94.4  86.8  83.1  93.4 
1993  89.2 88.9 95.7  88.6  88.8  95.2 
1994  91.9 91.5 98.3  91.6  91.3  97.8 
1995  100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1996  109.7 106.9 101.0  109.9  106.1  101.4 
1997  111.6 116.9 102.8  111.9  116.7  103.7 
1998  118.2 125.9 103.9  118.5  125.6  104.8 
1999  126.4 140.7 104.6  127.9  141.2  105.8 
2000  134.0 149.7 106.3  138.3  152.1  108.5 
2001  138.4 157.7 106.9  143.6  161.6  109.5 
2002  144.6 170.8 107.6  150.9  176.2  111.2 
2003  150.3 178.4 108.5  157.7  185.2  112.5 
Source: Groningen (2005) 
 
The relationship between market opening and productivity gains in the electricity, gas and 
water supply is even less clear-cut. This is because productivity gains in this sector had been 
higher than total industry both before and after the introduction of liberalisation reforms in 
mid-1990s. In both measures, productivity of electricity, gas and water supply had increased 
by approximately 20% from 1990-95 (before the reforms); whereas the increase in total 
industry productivity was around 10%. This performance indicates that productivity gains in 
the electricity, gas and water supply had preceded the introduction of EU-level market 
opening legislation in mid-1990s.  
 
In addition to the vagueness of the relationship between market opening and productivity, 
there is the question as to whether productivity gains have been achieved as a result of falling 
employment. Table 5 below provides some evidence that this may well have been the case in Europe. As can be seen from the table, employment in telecommunications as well as 
electricity, gas and water supply has fallen gradually over this period. This is in contrast to the 
gradual increase in total industrial employment. As a result, the percentage share of these 
sectors in total industrial employment has fallen gradually.  
 
Table 5: Employment in network industries and total industry: EU-15 
  
A. Electricity, 
gas water supply 
employment 
(thousands) 
 
B.Telecommunic
ations 
employment 
(thousands) 
 
C. Total 
industry 
employment 
(thousands) 
 
 
 
(A/C)*100 
(%) 
 
 
 
(B/C)*100 
(%) 
1990  1,405.0 2,785.3 158,851.6  0.88  1.75 
1991  1,396.6 2,788.3 159,647.4  0.87  1.75 
1992  1,353.2 2,731.3 157,604.7  0.86  1.73 
1993  1,322.2 2,695.1 155,071.0  0.85  1.74 
1994  1,290.1 2,639.4 154,801.3  0.83  1.71 
1995  1,240.5 2,566.8 156,120.1  0.79  1.64 
1996  1,204.7 2,553.8 157,080.1  0.77  1.63 
1997  1,170.3 2,516.0 158,622.4  0.74  1.59 
1998  1,141.7 2,517.0 161,335.9  0.71  1.56 
1999  1,104.3 2,541.4 164,270.7  0.67  1.55 
2000  1,063.1 2,636.3 167,653.6  0.63  1.57 
2001  1,053.8 2,702.9 169,876.4  0.62  1.59 
2002  1,040.7 2,655.9 170,738.1  0.61  1.56 
2003  1,021.1 2,613.1 171,167.1  0.60  1.53 
Source: Groningen (2005) 
 
Combining the evidence in Table 5 and Table 4, it is possible to argue that at least part of the 
productivity gains in these sectors has been due to falling employment – both in absolute 
terms and relative to total industrial employment. Recall that Copenhagen Economics (2005) 
estimates that market opening reforms have contributed 500,000 jobs over the whole 
economy. This may well be the case, but when viewed from a political economy perspective, 
the contrast between that optimistic estimate and the falling employment in the liberalised 
sectors goes a long way in explaining the hostility of employee organisations to market 
opening.  
 The evidence in Tables 1 – 5 above suggests that it is possible to relate expected outcomes 
such as falling prices, increased price convergence, and increased productivity to market 
opening reforms. However, this relationship is by no means clear-cut. Expected outcomes 
from market opening tended to be observable both before and after liberalisation reforms. In 
addition, it is quite difficult to relate expected outcomes to market opening when the 
incidence of the latter is very low. Market opening indices for all sectors have remained 
below 0.3 (30%) until 1995 and below 0.5 (50%) until 2000. Therefore, at least until mid-
1990s, it will be quite misleading to establish a causal relationship between market opening 
and price/productivity/employment performance in the network industries examined above. 
True, the relationship between market opening and sectoral performance tended to be more 
meaningful after mid-1990s. However, even then, we are still faced with the perennial 
second-best problem due to the fact that market opening reforms have removed only part of 
the existing distortions.  
 
This is why it is not surprising to observe a significant degree of consumer ambivalence 
towards the liberalisation of network industries in Europe. The majority of network industry 
consumers tend to express satisfaction with respect to prices, quality and accessibility.   
However, when one examines the changes in the level of satisfaction against the degree of 
market opening over time, the findings tend to be mixed in the sense that market opening over 
is associated with increased or decreased customer satisfaction. In addition, the level of 
satisfaction with respect to access and prices tends to be higher in less liberalised sectors such 
as gas and electricity compared to more liberalised sectors such as telephony services. 
Although customer satisfaction is not necessarily a true measure of welfare implications, it 
reveals significant information about perceptions concerning the welfare effects.  
 
Table 6 below is based on Eurobarometer survey results in 2000, 2002 and 2004. The table 
presents the difference in the level of satisfaction between 2000-2002 and 2000-2004 along 
three performance criteria for network industries: prices, quality, and accessibility. For each 
industry, the figures in the first row (% in 2000) represent the distribution of responses in 
2000 to the question about a particular criterion such as access, prices and quality. For 
example, for fixed telephony in 2000, 3.2% of the respondents indicated that they had no 
access, 4.07% indicated difficult access, and 92.72% indicated easy access to telephone. The 
figures in the second row (Change: 2000-04) represent the difference between the 2004 and 
2000 surveys. A negative value indicates a fall and a positive value indicates an increase in the percentage of the respondents. For example, in the fixed telephony case, the percentage of 
those who reported no access has increased by 0.12 percentage point whereas the percentage 
of those who reported easy access fell by 2.24.  
 
As can be seen from Table 6, the level of satisfaction with respect to three performance 
criteria (i.e., access, prices and quality) as well as the change in satisfaction between 2000-
2004 differ from one industry to the other; and from one criteria to the other. For example, in 
the most liberalised sector (i.e., fixed telephony), the satisfaction with respect to prices has 
increased by 19.51 percentage points, but satisfaction with respect to accessibility has 
deteriorated by 2.24 percentage points. In the least liberalised sector (i.e., gas supply), 
satisfaction with respect to prices increased by 8.96 percentage points whereas satisfaction 
with respect to access has fallen by 9.44 percentage points   
Table 6: Change in customer responses: EU-15, 2000-2004 
  The ACCESS criterion     
  No Access   Difficult Access   Easy Access   
Fixed telephony        
% in 2000  3.2  4.07  92.72   
Change: 2000-04  0.12  2.12  -2.24   
Electricity        
% in 2000  0.71  4.03  95.27   
Change: 2000-04  0.75  3.36  -4.11   
Gas supply        
% in 2000  12.63  5.75  81.62   
Change: 2000-04  5.82  3.62  -9.44   
        
  The PRICE criterion     
  Excessive Unfair  Fair   
Fixed telephony        
% in 2000  12.99  35.36  51.65   
Change: 2000-04  -4.16  -15.35  19.51   
Electricity        
% in 2000  10.76  30.54  58.69   
Change: 2000-04  -0.99  -8.31  9.3   
Gas supply        
% in 2000  9.75  29.41  60.84   
Change: 2000-04  -0.05  -8.91  8.96   
        
  The quality criterion     
  Very bad  Fairly bad   Fairly Good   Very Good  
Fixed telephony        
% in 2000  0.93  5.23  59.89  33.94 
Change: 2000-04  0.02  0.72  -1.01  0.28 
Electricity        
% in 2000  0.57  4.09  57.77  37.57 
Change: 2000-04  0.02  0.13  1.18  -1.33 
Gas supply        
% in 2000  0.96  4.72  58.66  35.66 
Change: 2000-04  -0.48  -0.75  4.23  -3.00 
 
Source: Eurobarometer (200 ….). See also, Fiorio et al (2007) 
 
 
The survey results reported in Table 6 are aggregate figures for EU-15. Fiorio et al (2007) use 
response data for each member state and try to establish the determinants of change in 
customer satisfaction from 2000-2004. Using a maximum likelihood method of estimation, 
they estimate the impact of various dimensions of the market opening reforms on consumer 
satisfaction. The estimation is repeated for three performance criteria – i.e., prices, quality, 
and accessibility. In this estimation, the level of satisfaction is defined as a function of 3 sets 
of variables: (i) individual characteristics such as sex, education, political views etc.; (ii) country fixed-effects such as GDP per head, Gini index, etc.; and (iii) market opening 
indicators such as public/private ownership, market share of the incumbent, ease of entry, and 
degree of vertical integration . The regression results are summarised in Table 7 below.  
 
Table 7: Summary of the effects of market opening on consumer satisfaction in EU-15: 
Fixed telephony, gas and electricity* 
  Smaller share of  
public ownership 
Smaller market share 
of incumbent 
Larger freedom  
to enter 
Less vertical  
integration 
Fixed telephony         
Access   -  +  +  n.a. 
Price   -  +  -  n.a. 
Quality -  +  -  n.a. 
Gas supply         
Access   -  -  -  + 
Price   -  +  n.s.  - 
Quality -  +  n.s.  - 
Electricity        
Access   n.s.  n.s.  +  - 
Price   +  n.a.  +  - 
Quality +  n.a.  +  n.s. 
+ = Positive effect on consumer satisfaction; - = negative effect on consumer satisfaction; 
n.a = not available;    n.s. = statistically not significant 
Source: Fiorio et al (2007: 24) 
 
Results reported in Table 7 confirm the ambivalence that can be captured from table 6. On the 
one hand, smaller market share of the incumbent tends to have a positive effect on customer 
satisfaction with fixed telephony and gas supply. This is the case for the three performance 
criteria concerning prices, accessibility and service quality. However, larger freedom for new 
entry tends to reduce customer satisfaction in fixed telephony and gas supply, whereas it tends 
to increase customer satisfaction in electricity supply. Finally, less vertical integration (i.e., 
separation of producers, network operators and retail suppliers) tends to reduce customer 
satisfaction with respect to all criteria for which data is available. It is important to note that 
these results are statistically significant at 1% or 5% and are obtained by controlling for 
individual as well as country characteristics. Given this state of affairs, one has to conclude 
that either the level of market opening in network industries is not optimal or customer 
information about market opening is impaired by imperfect information. Whichever conclusion is derived, it ties in with the general conclusion of the second-best theory which 
states that partial removal of distortions does not necessarily lead to welfare improvement. 
 
4. Market opening and sectoral performance: cross-country evidence 
 
The evidence we examine in this section lends further support to the prediction of the second-
best theory. It also enables us to move away from aggregated evidence for EU-15 and 
examine country-level dynamics. We begin with the impact of market opening reforms on 
market structure and price transparency. Then, we provide evidence on the extent of 
correlation between market opening reforms and price levels in the member states for which 
data is available.  
 
As far as market structure is concerned, the EU Commission (2005) report indicates that 
significant distortions still exist due to insufficient reduction in the market power of the 
largest companies in the gas, electricity and telecommunications sectors. With respect to 
electricity and gas sectors, the Commission reports that ‘markets in both sectors remain 
concentrated, creating scope for incumbent operators to influence prices.’  In addition, many 
wholesale markets are illiquid either due to long term contracts (gas) or because companies 
are active both in production and in the retail market, limiting the need for wholesale 
markets.’ Finally, the extent of unbundling is quite insufficient. With respect to fixed voice 
telephony, the Commission reports that the number of operators has increased from 635 to 
1237 between 1998 and 2004, but the number of ‘major competitors remain low in most 
countries and the market shares of incumbents are still high.’ Finally, in railways, the 
emergence of competition has been hindered by problems with access to the international 
network and an inadequate regulatory framework. (EU Commission, 2005: 5, 6). 
 
The assessment in the Commission’s report is confirmed by concentration ratios published by 
ERGEG – the European Regulatory Group for Electricity and Gas. As can be seen from Table 
8 below, the three largest companies tend to control between 100% and 75% of the market – 
with the exception of Germany and the UK where the concentration ratio ranges between 39% 
and 68%.  
  
Table 8: The share of 3 largest companies in gas and electricity markets 
Wholesale markets  Retail markets 
  Gas Electricity  Gas  Electricity 
Austria 80  53  n.a.  n.a. 
Belgium 100  95  95  94 
Denmark  95  75 100 40 
Finland 100  61  50  33 
France 98  95  99  97 
Germany n.a  68  26  40 
UK n.a  39  75  58 
Greece 100  98  100  100 
Italy 68  58  44  94 
Portugal n.a  72  n.a  98 
Spain 77  65  76  82 
Sweden 100  88  81  75 
The Netherlands  n.a  71  79  82 
Source: ERGEG (2007: 20, 21). 
 
The European Regulators Group for telecommunications (ERG) also provides evidence that 
indicates a high level of market concentration. As can be seen from Table 9 below, between 
70% and 100% of the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) that responded to ERG’s survey 
indicates that there is a significant market power (SMP) enjoyed a by a single company in the 
four sub-markets of the telecommunications market.  
 
Table 9: Single significant market power (SMP) in telecommunications:  
NRA answers in 2006 
  Market 10  Market 11  Market 12  Market 16 
  Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Portugal   N  Y    Y    Y   
Ireland  Y    Y   n.a.   Y   
Finland  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Sweden  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Germany  Y  Y  Y  Y  
France  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Italy  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Denmark  Y  Y  Y  Y  
UK   N  Y  Y  Y  Austria   N  Y  Y  Y  
Spain  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.   
Greece  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  Y   
Belgium  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.   
Netherlands  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  Y    Y   
Total  Yes/No  7  3 10 0 10 0 12 0 
 
Source: Derived from NRA answers in ERG (2005b) 
Notes:  
Market 10: Wholesale transit services in the public telephony network  
Market 11: Wholesale unbundled access to metallic loops and sub-loops for the provision of broadband 
and voice services 
Market 12: Bitstream access for transmission of broadband data (M12) 
Market 16: Wholesale voice call termination on mobile networks (share of other operators on a given 
mobile network)  
 
Market power associated with high levels of concentration is a major concern – especially 
when combined with very low demand elasticities for gas and electricity. The US experience 
between 1999-2000 suggests clearly that companies with high market power are likely to 
extract high levels of monopoly rents during sudden surges in demand or when supply reaches 
the maximum capacity level. For example, Borenstein et al (2002) report that, in the summer 
of 2000 in California, the Power Exchange market prices of electricity increased from $47.22 
per MWh in May to $120.20 per MWh in June, and the price remained over $100 for the rest 
of the year. As a result, expenditures on electricity increased from $2.04 billion in the summer 
of 1999 to $8.98 billion in the summer of 2000. Borenstein et al (2002) establish that 59% of 
the increase was due to market power of the existing companies, 21% was due to increase in 
production cost, and 20% was due to competitive rents. Between 1998 and 2000, oligopoly 
rents increased by more than ten-folds from $425 million to $4.44 billion. 
 
In addition, Borenstein et al (2002) reports that market power was also a major cause of 
allocative efficiencies due to substitution of more expensive production by firms with less 
market power FOR less expensive production by firms with high market power. The latter 
restrict production to increase their monopoly rents by increasing the difference between 
marginal cost and price. Then, the resulting higher market price enables less efficient firms to 
enter. A typical example of such allocative inefficiencies is the building of higher-cost 
combined-cycle gas turbine generators to provide base-load power that could be supplied 
more cheaply by coal-fired plants. 
 The US experience took place against an institutional background characterised by high 
volumes or market trade and price transparency. In Europe, even these conditions are not 
satisfied. Market trading is low due to long-term contracts and price transparency – especially 
small consumers – is not ensured yet. The inadequacy of price transparency is evident from 
Table 10 below.  
 
Table 10: NRA responses concerning price transparency for gas and electricity  
         Transparency   
  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7  Index 
Spain    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.00  0.11 
Sweden    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00  0.29 
France    1.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00  0.32 
Portugal    0.75 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00  0.32 
Ireland    0.50 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.75 0.00  0.43 
Italy    1.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50  0.50 
Finland    1.00 0.50 0.50 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.50  0.68 
Austria    1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.71 
Greece   1.00  1.00  1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  0.71 
Netherlands    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00  0.82 
Belgium    1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.75 1.00  0.89 
Great  Britain    1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 1.00  0.89 
EU-12  Av.    0.77 0.44 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.42  0.56 
Source: Derived from NRA answers in ERGEG (2005: 14, 15, 18). 
 
Transparency measure:  
1.00 = full transparency;  0.25 – 0.75 = incomplete transparency;   0 = no transparency 
Transparency criteria: 
C1: Publication of list price is required (by default supplier) 
C2: Publication of offer price is required (by new supplier or when moving to a different tariff)  
C3: Does every supplier publish prices or just the incumbent? 
C4: Does supplier provide price information to the regulator or another body? 
C5: When are prices published: before or after the price change? 
C6: How can a customer compare prices: platform for information and who provides it? 
C7: Is comparability of prices ensured? 
 
 
The index in Table 10 is constructed as follows: For each transparency criterion, we assign a 
value of 1 if the response from the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) confirms 
transparency; a value between 0.25 - 0.75 if the answer is qualified; and a value of 0 if the 
answer confirms that the criterion is not met. The index in the last column and last row is the 
sum of indices in each cell divided by the number of countries (the last row of the table) or by the number of criteria (the last column of the table). The criteria (C1-C7) are described in the 
note under the table. The table shows that no member state satisfies the condition of full 
transparency with respect to all criteria. Similarly, no single criterion is satisfied by all 
member states. In addition, ERGEG (2005) explicitly states that NRAs did not provide 
detailed information about how transparency is ensured when they report that this is the case. 
In other words, the index is actually too generous a measure of transparency. Despite this, the 
overall level of transparency is 0.56 - with significant inter-country variation from 0.11 to 
0.89 and inter-criteria variation from 0.42 to 0.77.  
 
According to ERGEG (2005: 5), the lack of transparency benefits incumbents, undermines the 
position of new entrants, and aggravates consumer mistrust in the price formation mechanism. 
That is why the EU Commission (2007: 8) reports that all network users demand more 
transparency and that there is little harmonisation between member-state transparency 
requirements. Although price transparency is a necessary condition for efficient functioning 
of the markets it is by no means sufficient. This is because increased price transparency also 
increases the risk of collusion between suppliers. Current EU documents recognise this risk, 
but the regulatory legislation does not address it.  
 
Another question that arises in the context of market opening reforms is whether or not there 
is a correlation between the level of market opening and the level of prices across countries. 
In Tables 2 and 3 above, we have seen that this relationship was not clear-cut at the aggregate 
EU level. Is the situation different when take a cross-section view?  
 
To answer this question, we make use of the market opening index (MOI) for each EU 
member state. The disaggregated data for this index is obtained from Copenhagen Economics 
directly. We take the value of MOI for a particular sector in a particular EU member state in 
the last year of observation (2003) and multiply it with the number of years during which the 
MOI was equal to or greater than 0.3 between 1990 and 2003. The resulting index is labelled 
as weighted MOI in order to account for the significance of the time during which the level of 
market opening had been significant (i.e., ≥ 0.3). For example, the MOI for the rail passenger 
transport in Austria in 2003 is 0.4. In addition, Austria has had an MOI index of 0.3 or greater 
for 7 years. Then the weighted MOI for Austria is 0.4 x 7 = 2.8. For Greece, however, the 
weighted MOI is zero because Greece, until 2003, has not had any year during which the 
market opening index was equal to or greater than 0.3. The results are given in Table 11.    Table 11: Weighted Market Opening Index (MOI) in 2003: EU-15 
 
 Rail 
passenger 
transport 
Rail 
freight 
transport 
Gas Telecoms  Electricity 
Austria  2.80  3.68 1.38 2.72 1.98 
Belgium  2.52  3.54 1.62 2.04 3.00 
Denmark  2.80  4.65 1.89 6.79 4.00 
Finland  3.78  3.60 0.00 3.30 6.48 
France  1.92  3.08 1.96 3.70 1.65 
Germany  5.70  9.40 2.20 3.30 3.30 
Greece 0.00  0.00  0.00 1.06 0.82 
Ireland  2.00  0.00 4.86 2.43 2.04 
Italy  0.00  1.92 3.85 2.52 2.04 
Luxemburg  0.38  3.92 2.24 1.53 0.00 
The  Netherlands  2.30  7.83 2.20 4.44 2.19 
Portugal  2.45  0.00 0.00 2.37 1.83 
Spain  0.39  0.38 3.52 3.75 2.28 
Sweden  9.38  8.85 1.96 2.28 6.32 
UK 10.00  11.16  6.00  10.01  12.88 
 
Having constructed a weighted MOI that takes into account the length of time during which 
market opening has been significant, we can now try to establish if there is any correlation 
between the weighted market opening index and the level of the price index in 2003, which is 
based on 1997 = 100 for each member state. The Pearson’s Rank Correlation coefficients for 
each pair of variables are given in Table 12 below, which excludes rail transport due to non-
availability of national price data.  
 
Table 12: Correlation between weighted MOI and price indices for member states: 2003 
 
Variables 
Pearson’s Rank  
Correlation Coefficient 
 
Significance 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Electricity household price index in 2003  - 0.133  n.s 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Electricity industrial price index in 2003  -0.007  n.s. 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Gas household price index in 2003  -0.168  n.s. 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Gas industrial price index in 2003  0.336  n.s. 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Telecom local call price index in 2003  -0.506  * 
Weighted MOI in 2003 vs Telecom national call price index in 2003  0.072  n.s. 
n.s. = not statistically significant;  * = significant at 10%  
As can be seen from the table, the correlation coefficient is statistically significant only for the 
local call prices in 2003. The sign of the coefficient is also as expected. As the MOI increases 
across member states, the price index tends to fall. This result reinforces the observation we 
made in relation to price trends at the EU level in Table 2: as market opening deepens, local 
telephone prices tend to fall across the EU. The correlation coefficients have the correct sign 
for electricity household and industrial prices and for the gas household prices. However, 
these coefficients are not statistically significant. Finally, the correlation coefficients have the 
wrong sign in the case gas industrial prices and national telephone calls. These results suggest 
that it is not possible to conclude that market opening is necessarily associated with lower 
prices across member states. This is due to the fact that the impact of market opening on 
prices in each member state differs too much to allow for a statistically significant correlation 
between the two variables. This is yet another indication that the second-best problem is 
relevant to the gradual market opening in European network industries.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The evidence presented above indicates that market opening reforms in European network 
industries are essentially a movement from one second-best to another. Market opening 
reforms have replaced the natural monopoly under public ownership with oligopolistic 
markets where ownership could be either public or private. Therefore: (i) it is difficult to 
establish that market opening reforms have been conducive to a general decline in prices, with 
the notable exception of telecommunications; (ii) it is equally difficult to conclude that the 
resulting oligopolistic competition is necessarily more efficient than the previous regime. The 
evidence on the implications of market opening reforms provides a number of indicators as to 
why this is the case.  
 
With respect to the gas and electricity sectors, the main indicators are: (1) high levels of 
market concentration and market power; (2) inadequate unbundling of network and supply 
markets; (3) lack of market integration, especially lack of regulatory oversight for cross 
border issues; and (4) lack of transparency in price formation. These shortcomings are 
highlighted not only in the evidence discussed above, but also in EU Commission reports as 
well as reports by the European Regulatory Group for Electricity and Gas (ERGEG).  
 There are also country-specific studies, which indicate that market opening in the electricity 
sector may be conducive to mixed results. For example Thomas (2004: 368) reports that the 
wholesale market in the UK is dominated by non-transparent long-term contracts; retail 
competition has disadvantaged small consumers; and integrated generation and retail supply 
companies dominate the market.  With respect to California, Mitra et al (2005: 441-445) 
report that deregulation (i.e., the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission Orders of 1996) has not led to production or cost efficiency in the 
electricity market. One is reason is inelastic short-run demand, which prevents the demand 
side from controlling abusive pricing behaviour. The other is persistent market concentration 
and oligopolistic behaviour.  
 
In the gas market too, the incumbents remain dominant by largely controlling up-stream gas 
imports and/or domestic gas production. They trade only a small proportion of their gas on 
gas exchange markets (‘hubs’). Even when trade occurs on gas exchanges, 1-3 players 
account for 100% of that trade. Combined with little new entry in retail markets, this situation 
reduces customer choice and limits competition. (EU Commission, 2007).  
 
In both gas and electricity markets, new entrants do not have effective access to networks 
despite unbundling provisions. This is because the incumbent operators tend to favour their 
own affiliates and existing unbundling provisions do not eliminate vertical integration that 
gives rise to proliferation of incumbent affiliates. Therefore, operational and investment 
decisions are taken in accordance with the interests of the integrated company and not in the 
interest of network/infrastructure operations. (EU Commission, 2007: 8; ERGEG, 2006: 6). 
Finally, there is evident lack of transparency about prices as well as access charges, leading to 
information asymmetries between the incumbents on the one hand and their competitors as 
well as consumers on the other. 
 
The level of competition is relatively higher in the telecommunications sector. Nevertheless, 
significant market power enjoyed by a single operator is still prevalent in the majority of the 
member states. In addition, regulatory provisions for addressing market power are not 
consistent across member states; and provision of pan-European services is still not allowed. 
(ERG, 2005). As a result, competition within national markets may have increased but the 
oligopolistic structure in each EU member-state remains largely intact. 
 In  the rail transport sector, the modality and level of market opening differs significantly 
between member states. Despite the fact that market opening reforms in this sector have 
arrived late, they have been followed by an evident trend towards market concentration 
through mergers and acquisitions. This is likely to increase market power. However, this may 
be counterbalanced by the emergence of ‘European’ strategies that enable some operators to 
operate in several national markets. This, however, will reduce market power if it is 
associated with new entry, which is not the case. According to Scherp (2005: 4), high market 
share and strong capital base of the national incumbents make new entry difficult – as it was 
the case with the ‘European Bulls’ alliance set up by five new entrants.  
 
The findings above are closely related to the prediction of the second-best theory – namely 
that partial removal of existing distortions does not necessarily lead to Pareto-optimality. 
Although it is feasible to argue that market opening reforms are steps in the right direction 
and that they should reduce the inefficiencies associated with natural monopolies, the overall 
result in terms of efficiency and welfare is not necessarily better. Studies on the effects of 
liberalisation reforms and deregulation may well yield positive results, these results do not 
take account the welfare and efficiency loss due to distortions that persist after liberalisation.  
 
From a political economy perspective, the deficiencies of the market opening reforms in 
network industries have a significant implication for the process of European integration. 
Unlike the single market programme, support for market opening reforms will continue to be 
uneven between member states and between the various stakeholders. This is due to the fact 
that these reforms, unlike the removal of non-tariff barriers through the single market, do not 
constitute a move to the first-best. As a move within the second-best environment, market 
opening reforms cannot guarantee the achievement of Pareto-optimality. In this case, overall 
welfare may increase, decrease or remain the same. In addition to this uncertainty, even an 
increase in overall welfare may be associated with worsening of the income/welfare 
distribution that was underpinning the previous level of welfare. In other words, welfare 
improvement may not be optimal in Paretian sen s e .  T h i s  w i l l  l e a d  t o  r e s i s t a n c e  f r o m  
stakeholders who are likely to loose and will reduce government willingness to push for the 
reforms. In addition, stakeholders who benefit from market opening reforms at the current 
level may resist further reform as the latter may cause a fall in their current levels of welfare.  
As a result, market opening reform in network industry is highly like to be a protracted 
process, characterised by piecemeal policy making and high incidence of compromises.  
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